The Work Programme

Perceptions and Experiences of the Voluntary Sector

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The National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) is the largest general membership body for charities and voluntary organisations in England. We cover a wide spectrum of organisations including social enterprises, charities and voluntary groups. Established in 1919, NCVO represents over 8500 organisations with members in every local authority area, from large household names to small groups operating at the local level.

The NCVO Special Interest Group (SIG) for Work Programme subcontractors represents voluntary and community organisations involved in the Government’s new welfare-to-work initiative. The group enables subcontractors to share their experiences and enables NCVO to feed their concerns direct to Government. The group is open to all voluntary organisations who act as subcontractors on the Work Programme. Membership currently stands at over 150 voluntary organisations and counting. For more information or to join please contact Paul Winyard at paul.winyard@ncvo-vol.org.uk.
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Foreword

This report comes at a key time both for the Work Programme, for our members and for the wider voluntary sector. In common with many issues currently affecting voluntary organisations, the Work Programme presents many opportunities to support our beneficiaries, but the economic climate combined with a rapidly evolving policy climate and structural problems within public service contracts are challenging.

This survey is the second time we have gathered the views of our Special Interest Group (SIG) of subcontractors on the Work Programme in the voluntary sector. Our aim is to provide a contribution to important debates around the Work Programme - to highlight challenges for our members and to propose solutions to enable them to best serve their beneficiaries.

Whilst this survey highlights the resilience and commitment to providing high quality services amongst voluntary organisations, evidenced for example by the very low levels of 'parking' even in the most difficult cases, there remain significant concerns. There are worrying signs about the sustainability of current Work Programme contracts, with this research finding a majority who identified their contract as at risk of failure. In these difficult times, it is more important than ever that voluntary organisations are able to plan ahead with confidence. That is why a considerable mismatch between anticipated referral flows of Work Programme customers and the reality has once again been identified as a concern. The lack of robust and comprehensive data - particularly below prime contractor level - threatens to further undermine confidence and the ability to plan.

It is our hope that these findings provide a useful source of evidence and that the concerns highlighted here are taken seriously. Given the likely extension of the prime-sub contractor model as used in the Work Programme to other areas of public services, it is to be hoped that these problems can be ironed out. NCVO will be working with the SIG and our wider membership over the coming months to make recommendations to policy makers on how best the sector can contribute to the future of the Work Programme and public services more widely.

Sir Stuart Etherington
Chief Executive of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations
Background

In October 2011 the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) published a report entitled ‘The Work Programme – Initial Concerns from Civil Society Organisations’. Drawing on existing studies and feedback from the newly created NCVO Special Interest Group for Work Programme subcontractors (SIG) and the voluntary and community sector (VCS) more widely, the paper highlighted many of the concerns held by the sector as the fledgling Work Programme was starting out. Following the report, members of the SIG were invited to complete a simple survey exploring early experience of the programme.

This survey follows up on this work, albeit with a slightly different focus. Whereas last year’s research primarily concentrated on highlighting the concerns of VCS organisations, this survey, coinciding as it does with the first anniversary of the programme, explores experience one year since the Work Programme first went live.

Methodology

Responses to this survey were collected through two waves of research. The first collected 70 responses from the SIG between April and May 2012. To increase the response rate it was decided to spread the net further afield to non-SIG voluntary sector subcontractors delivering on the Work Programme.

To assist with this national reach, NCVO worked in partnership with Channel 4 News whose on-going research into the Work Programme also required evidence from the ‘frontline’. This second wave increased the response rate to 98 - 31 tier 1 providers; 58 tier 2 providers; and 8 tier 1 and 2 providers.

The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) February 2012 stocktake of Work Programme supply chains registers 92 VCS organisations operating at tier 1 and 304 operating at tier 2, so the trend towards more tier 2 responses was expected.

To maximise the response rate it was decided to keep the survey as simple as possible with a balance struck between the need for detail on one hand and brevity and ease of use on the other. The survey is consequently relatively modest in its ambitions and leaves some questions requiring further investigation. Nevertheless it does provide a rare and important snapshot of voluntary sector experience one year into Work Programme contracts, and while the figures below may not always match the reality on the ground they do at the very least reflect the perceptions of those questioned, showing that confidence in the Work Programme is potentially being undermined.

The survey includes responses from the supply chain of every prime contractor delivering the Work Programme in England, although the number of responses from each varies, from 25 associated with one prime contractor to only one from another. A commitment to anonymity means the identities of all respondents have been protected. In some instances, more than one response was collected from a single organisation holding multiple subcontracts.

2 Special Interest Group (SIG) webpage: http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/employmentskillstraining/SIG
The survey questions are reproduced in the appendix to this paper. As the responses totalled slightly less than 100, the analysis below is expressed by respondent rate rather than percentage.

1. Referrals

There has been much commentary over recent months regarding low referral volumes to the voluntary sector and its impact on the sustainability of Work Programme contracts. With an increasing number of organisations being forced to exit their contracts, getting a clearer picture of the situation as it exists was a priority of this survey.

1.1 Referrals received to date

Choosing from the options 0; 1-10; 11-25; 26-50; or 50+ each respondent was asked approximately how many referrals they have received to date (Figure 1.1). Over one third said they have not received any referrals at all, while a further 15 per cent said they have only received between one and 10. Just fewer than 40 per cent said they have received 50 referrals or more.

Although these figures say little about the value and nature of the customer engagement, they do provide a rough indication of the current levels of work going to VCS organisations. They also broadly support anecdotal feedback from the SIG and the welfare to welfare sector more widely that many organisations - particularly those involved in tier 2 or ‘specialist intervention’ service provision – are struggling with the situation as it exists (see figure 1.2).

![Figure 1.1](image)

Figure 1.1 ‘Approximately how many referrals have you received to date?’

1.2 Referrals received to date by tier

With so many of the recent reports surrounding low referral volumes coming from organisations involved in tier 2 or ‘specialist intervention’ service provision it is unsurprising that the vast majority of respondents who claim to have not received any referrals come from this section of providers. With over three times as many VCS organisations involved in tier 2 delivery as tier 1, it is inevitable the sector is feeling the brunt of this shortage. The extent to which this is due to lower than anticipated
Employment Support Allowance (ESA) customer referrals - exacerbated by overly optimistic forecasts by government before the Work Programme was launched in June 2011\(^5\) - or because primes are not passing on customers is difficult to determine without more comprehensive referral data being made available (see section 1.5).

**Figure 1.2** Referrals to date by tier

1.3 Referrals received without payment
Respondents were asked approximately what percentage of their referrals they have not received payment for from their prime contractor (Figure 1.3). Over one fifth claimed to have experienced non-payment to some extent with six claiming to have not received payment for 100% of referrals received to date. Of these six, one had received over 50 referrals; two between 26-50; one between 11-26 and two between 1-10. These findings support anecdotal evidence from the SIG and the voluntary sector more generally that some VCS organisations are not being fairly compensated for their work.

1.4. Referral volumes and initial expectations
Respondents were asked how their referral volumes to date compare with their initial expectations of the scheme (Figure 1.4). Exactly half of those questioned said the amount received significantly fell short of what they initially expected, while a further nine said volumes were slightly less than expected. Of this combined 58 responses, 78 per cent are tier 2 providers. Indeed, only two tier 2 respondents claimed their referral volumes significantly exceeded initial expectations. These findings represent a broad continuation from last year’s SIG survey which found that 72 per cent of tier 2 respondents were ‘not at all satisfied’ with the level of referrals. They also raise serious questions about the sustainability of some VCS delivery agreements. Of the 71 respondents who believe their contracts are at risk of failure (see Figure 2.1), 47 said the volume of referrals received to date has been significantly lower than expected, while 33 have not received any at all.

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\(^5\) Hansard – Cabinet Office Questions, 27 April 2011 available via: [http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110427/debtext/110427-0001.htm](http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110427/debtext/110427-0001.htm)
1.5 Primes keeping customers in-house

There has been much speculation regarding the extent to which prime contractors are servicing Work Programme customers in-house who might benefit more from another organisation’s area of expertise. There is little doubt that those referrals closely associated with voluntary sector provision – Employment Support Allowance – have been much lower than originally forecast by government. However, concerns remain that some referrals are being ‘creamed’ off by primes to the disadvantage of VCS subcontractors and more importantly, Work Programme customers.

Figure 1.5 shows that 29 respondents believe their prime contractor is keeping customers in-house who would benefit more from their organisation’s area of expertise. Of these, 26 believe their contract is at risk of failure before the end of the contract period (see Section 2.1 for contract sustainability).
However, with so many respondents expressing uncertainty in answering this question, drawing solid conclusions remains difficult. That said the fact that more respondents perceive it a problem than those who do not indicates that this particular issue warrants further investigation. Indeed, referral data below the level of prime contractor would help shed light on the matter. This would allow forthcoming performance data to be cross-referenced with who is servicing particular customer groups. In December 2011 DWP went some way towards this with a ‘one off’ note showing the total proportion of VCS referrals within supply chain structures\(^6\). Government should now put in place a mechanism for regularly publishing this information within each supply chain alongside performance data.

\[\text{Figure 1.5} \text{ ‘Do you believe your prime contractor is keeping customers in-house who would benefit more from your organisation’s area of expertise?’} \]

1.6 The random allocation of referrals
The random allocation of referrals between the two or three primes working within a particular contract package area has been a subject of concern since the Work Programme first went live. It is argued that some customers might be forgoing the most appropriate support because an organisation more suitable for addressing their needs is in the supply chain of a competing prime contractor. Random allocation also has the potential to cut across already established relationships and inter-agency working. While the findings expressed in Figure 1.6 are somewhat inconclusive in that over one half of respondents say it’s difficult to determine whether random allocation is having a detrimental effect on a customer’s Work Programme journey, 22 respondents do believe it is a problem. This along with high levels of uncertainty and the importance of providing the correct level support for all customers suggests the matter possibly warrants a detailed investigation into customer experience.

A similar question was asked in the 2011 SIG survey, ‘Do you feel the ‘lottery’ nature of the referral process means that some customers are forgoing the appropriate support’. 40 per cent of respondents considered it ‘very much’ a problem with a further 44 per cent claiming it was a problem ‘to some extent’. While the questions are somewhat different, this does suggest the issue of random allocation is not perceived as negatively as it was around a year ago.

2. Contracts and funding

There are concerns about VCS organisations struggling to make their current contractual arrangements commercially viable. This coupled with recent reports of charities exiting the Work Programme (including household names with substantial turnovers\(^7\)) meant exploring the severity of the situation was important.

2.1 The sustainability of contracts

Perhaps the most alarming finding of the survey is the level of concern surrounding the sustainability of Work Programme contracts. Figure 2.1 shows that only 27 respondents believe their contract is sustainable for the full term while 46 believe their contacts are at risk of failure within six months and 25 before the end of the contract period. This raises serious questions about the voluntary sector’s role in delivering the Work Programme, and consequently the diverse and responsive supply chains that jobseekers with multiple barriers to work rely upon.

Worryingly, 28 respondents claimed to have not yet received a formal contract from their prime contractor. This suggests Figure 2.1 was answered in terms of the respondent’s current Work Programme agreement. The absence of this many formal contracts suggests some service delivery agreements are based solely on email exchanges, letters, telephone conversations or face-to-face meetings, or that some respondents are still negotiating the finer details of their contract. In fact 23 respondents claimed to have renegotiated the terms of their contract since beginning their Work Programme delivery. Despite this, the absence of a formal contract in many cases is a matter of concern as disagreement is inevitable without a written agreement of what is required from both parties.

\(^7\)St Mungo’s leaves Work Programme after failing to receive any referrals’ available via: http://www.thirdsector.co.uk/news/1131555/st-mungos-leaves-work-programme-failing-receive-referrals/
2.2 Financial terms agreed with prime contractor

It would be intuitive to expect a correlation between the sustainability of contracts and the sustainability of the financial terms respondents have agreed to with their prime contractor. However, only 23 respondents believe their terms are unsustainable, compared with 71 who claim their contracts are at risk of failure. With a further 44 respondents expressing uncertainty, the conclusions that can be drawn from this question are limited (Figure 2.2). That said the 26 respondents who believe their financial terms are sustainable drops to just eight when the question is cross-tabulated with the 71 respondents who question the sustainability of their contracts (see Figure 2.2.1). Therefore, while the matter is far from straightforward it does appear that the financial terms agreed to are a contributing factor. The phasing out of attachment fees over the next couple of years is likely to exacerbate the situation. As discussed at a recent SIG meeting, government should consider conducting an impact analysis into the removal of attachment fees in light of the current economic climate.

2.3 Payment levels

Respondents were given the option of divulging the level of payment they receive from their prime contractor for attachment fees; job outcome fees; and sustainment payments. Although the majority chose not to answer these questions, perhaps because they felt the information was commercially sensitive or because of concerns relating to anonymity, 26 did respond. A commitment to confidentiality forbids reiterating specifics as this could potentially identify a particular contractual relationship. That said by analysing the available data it was possible to identify an average management fee of 15-20 per cent. It is difficult to know whether this constitutes a fair and realistic levy for processing and passing on Work Programme customers; and as such, perhaps warrants further investigation based on robust administrative data from both government and prime contractors.

2.4 Support from prime contractor

Another issue potentially impacting on the sustainability of contracts is the extent to which respondents feel their prime contractor has helped them organise manage with the payment structure of the Work Programme (Figure 2.4). Only 13 respondents felt their prime had helped them in this respect, with this dropping to just six when the question was put to the 71 respondents who believe their contract are at risk of failure.
In October 2011 members of the SIG were asked a similar question: ‘To what extent do you feel your prime has used its financial scale to shield your organisation from financial risk?’ with 58 per cent replying ‘not at all’ and 21 per cent ‘to a small extent’. While the questions differ, the underlying sentiment is comparable thus drawing a broad correlation between the two surveys is possible. Helping VCS organisations with the payment structure of the Work Programme is particularly important as they often lack the working capital needed to deal with the payment lag of the PbR model®.

8 “Welfare to work scheme co-ordinating firm goes bankrupt” available via: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/jul/15/ welfare-work-firm-bankrupt
3. Subsidisation

3.1 Subsidising service delivery with subcontractor reserves
Casting further doubt over the long-term sustainability of VCS service delivery is the level of Work Programme provision that is being subsidised by respondents. Figure 3.1 shows 48 of those questioned claim to be subsidising their service delivery with their organisation’s own reserves. The ability of the Work Programme to cater for a wide range of customers with varying barriers to employment rests upon diverse supply chains that incorporate providers with niche specialisms. If some of these organisations are bankrolling their customer engagement then it is only a matter of time until some will be forced to halt delivery. Indeed, 30 out of the 48 respondents who claim their organisation is subsidising delivery also believe their contracts are at risk of failure.

Interestingly, 14 respondents who claim to be subsidising their Work Programme delivery said the financial terms they’ve agreed with their prime are sustainable. This possibly suggests that in some cases the terms themselves are sustainable, but the time lag element of the payment by results (PbR) model is where the problem lies. This could explain why 40 out of the 48 respondents that said they are subsidising their delivery also claim their prime has not helped them with the payment structure of the Work Programme. This finding reinforces the concerns of some commentators that the Work Programme’s PbR model is incompatible with the financial structure of VCS organisations, many of whom only hold around three months of reserves.

3.2 The ‘parking’ of Work Programme customers
High levels of subsidy by the VCS perhaps partly explain the low occurrence of customer ‘parking’ (see figure 3.2). Of the 78 respondents who said they have not had to ‘park’ any customers, 35 claim to have subsidised their Work Programme delivery with their own reserves. It could also be the case that some respondents are reluctant to admit to ‘parking’ their beneficiaries, even when anonymity has been guaranteed. The general absence of parking might also be partly explained by the cost of intervention

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9 Single Homeless Project...subsidising its own work, which was not sustainable ‘available via:
not exceeding the payment on offer. Where the balance lies will hopefully become clearer then Work Programme performance data is released in late 2012 as this should help throw light on what some groups are, and are not, receiving adequate provision.

**Figure 3.1** ‘Has your organisation had to subsidise any of its Work Programme delivery with its own reserves?’

**Figure 3.2** ‘Have you had to ‘park’ any customers because the cost of intervention exceeds the payment on offer?’

### 4. Data transparency

#### 4.1 Sharing supply chain performance data

Figure 4.1 shows that two thirds of respondents claim their prime is not sharing supply chain performance data with their organisation. It is generally accepted that for a supply chain to operate effectively it is essential that performance data, including that of the prime, be shared between delivery partners. Not only is it important for driving competition and a fully functioning market (by allowing organisations to know how they are performing relative to others), but openness and transparency are
also crucial for developing trust. In fact, open data of this kind is a driving principle of the Coalition Government’s public services reform agenda, as laid out in the Open Public Services White Paper of 2011\textsuperscript{10}. NCVO, the Association of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations (ACEVO) and the Employment Related Services Association (ERSA) have also highlighted the importance of sharing performance data in this way in a recently published guide on ‘good practice’ within welfare to work supply chains\textsuperscript{11}.

\textbf{Figure 4.1} ‘Does your prime share supply chain performance data with your organisation?’

\begin{figure}[h]
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\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Chart showing the distribution of responses to the question 'Does your prime share supply chain performance data with your organisation?'.}
\end{figure}

4.2 ‘Gagging clauses‘ and the dissemination of good and bad practice

Like many of the issues visited in this survey the subject of ‘gagging clauses’ in Work Programme contracts has received considerable media and political attention over recent months. Many subcontractors have signed contracts that state they must not do anything to ‘attract adverse publicity’ for DWP or make any press statements or publicise the contract without approval from the department. Again, not only does this contradict the spirit of the government’s public services reform agenda, it also calls into question the long-standing and centrally important principle of the independence of charities. Importantly, there are also fears that it has potential consequences for the sharing of good and bad practice. Although Figure 4.2 shows that the majority of respondents do not see ‘gagging clauses’ as a substantial barrier to the dissemination of information, nearly one third disagree. If this is replicated across all Work Programme supply chains then a considerable amount of useful information is potentially being lost. For this reason government should carefully consider calls from some industry commentators for ‘gagging clauses’ to be dispensed with.

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5. Respondents’ relationships with their prime contractors

Using a scale of 1-to-10 respondents were asked to rate the relationship with their prime contractor. Figure 5 shows that over one third of respondents ranked their relations in the lowest decile (‘Not at all satisfied’) almost equalling the 34 respondents spread across the entire 6-10 range. Perhaps statistically significant, of the 33 responses ranking their relations in the lowest decile, 27 claim to have not received any referrals to date, while 28 believe their Work Programme contract is at risk of failure within the next six months.

6. Conclusion

One year into Work Programme contracts VCS organisations are starting to get a clearer picture of what delivering the government’s flagship welfare reform initiative means for them. Because of the relative
simplicity of the survey, drawing definitive conclusions from the evidence gathered is difficult. However, the feedback above does provide a useful indication of the trajectory of the Work Programme after contracts have had a reasonable amount of time to bed in, and while some of the findings might not necessarily reflect the experience of all providers, they do highlight worrying levels of negative perception that if left unchecked could potentially undermine confidence to the detriment of government, providers and most importantly, jobseekers themselves.

It is now widely acknowledged within the welfare to work industry that referrals to the voluntary sector have been far lower than what was initially expected when the Work Programme was launched in June 2011. Few would argue this is partly due to issues surrounding the Work Capability Assessment resulting in fewer ESA referrals than originally anticipated. However, the findings above do raise questions regarding the extent to which primes are keeping referrals in-house that would be more appropriately serviced by their subcontractor partners. Unfortunately, until government puts into place a mechanism for publishing referral data below the level of prime contractor it is difficult to determine the extent to which these suspicions are justified. Prime contractors already possess this information so making it publicly accessible should not incur substantial costs. Openness and transparency in this respect should also inform the way in which ‘gagging clauses’ are viewed. There is a danger of prohibiting debate and the sharing of performance data which only seeks to encourage negative perceptions of the Work Programme.

The extent to which VCS subcontractors are being used for free service delivery by primes is also unclear and warrants further investigation. Indeed, this once again highlights the need for an independent and anonymous complaints procedure separate from the Merlin Mediation Service which is currently only available once a prime’s own dispute handling processes has failed to achieve resolution. While there are situations where direct dialogue between a prime and subcontractor is the most appropriate way to resolve a dispute, there are instances where the identity of a subcontractor needs to be protected to safeguard against future reprisals – perceived or otherwise.

While the majority of respondents expressed uncertainty regarding the extent to which the random allocation of referrals has prohibited customers from benefitting from their own organisation’s area of expertise, nearly one quarter perceive it as a problem. This issue was raised at an NCVO SIG meeting attended by Chris Grayling MP, then the Minister for Employment in April 2012. Encouragingly the Minister suggested there might be some leeway for relaxing the rigidity of the allocation process in extenuating circumstances (for example, where established relationships already exist between a subcontractor and a jobseeker) although to date there have been no notable developments in this area. In light of these findings NCVO would once again urge government to revisit the issue.

Probably the most worrying of the survey’s findings is the high level of concern surrounding the sustainability of subcontracts. Where the balance lies between undesirable funding terms, a lack of prime contractor support in managing the PbR model, low levels of referrals or a challenging labour market is unclear. However, in light of so many respondents claiming to have subsidised their Work Programme delivery with their organisation’s own reserves the issue urgently demands a thorough government investigation based on administrative data and comprehensive referral information. Indeed the fear is that in many cases the situation will become untenable for some organisations as it has for others already. With Work Programme customers relying on diverse supply chains containing organisations with niche specialisms every effort must be made to safeguard against the loss of this expertise.

12‘The Merlin Standard – Complaints and Mediation’ available via http://www.merlinstandard.co.uk/mediation.php
7. Recommendations

- In the interest of transparency ‘gagging clauses’ should be reviewed as their removal would better enable constructive debate of the Work Programme. Transparency, advocacy and holding government and public services to account are at the heart of the VCS. DWP should clarify its guidance around ‘gagging clauses’ to ensure that they are being interpreted correctly and to tackle the perception that they prevent the sharing of good practice.

- Government should collect and release data on referral flows below the level of prime contractor. A six-monthly stocktake of supply chains does not reflect the true level of VCS involvement in the Work Programme or the experience of customers and how effectively they are being served.

- Government should immediately investigate current funding arrangements to determine why so many contracts are at risk of failure; why some VCS organisations are subsidising their service delivery; and to assess whether the market is functioning properly or perverse incentives are at play which threaten to reduce market diversity.

- Government should put in place an independent and anonymous complaints procedure to allow subcontractors to report suspected transgressions – including the use of VCS organisations for free service delivery – free from fear of reprisal.

- Government should relax the random allocation of referrals in extenuating circumstances, for example where well-established relationships already exist or where a more appropriate service provider is in an alternative supply chain.

- Government should explore the feasibility of providing a support programme to help VCS orgs manage their budgets, forecasts and cash flow; provide access to capital to assist with the payment lag of the PbR model; and should encourage prime contractors to support their supply chains through shared services and building skills.

- Government should conduct an impact analysis into the withdrawal of attachment fees and consider whether the timing should be altered in the light of current economic and labour market conditions.
Appendix A – Survey questions

1. Organisation name

2. Prime contractor

3. Contract Package Area

4. What tier does your organisation operate at?
   - tier 1
   - tier 2
   - tier 1 and 2

5. Have you received a formal contract with your prime contractor?
   - Yes
   - No

6. What date did you sign your contract? (state N/A if not applicable)

7. Have you renegotiated the terms of your contract since first signing?
   - Yes
   - No
   - N/A
   If yes, please provide details

8. On a scale of 1-10 how satisfied are you with the relationship with your prime contractor?
   - 1= Not at all satisfied 10 = Very satisfied

9. Approximately how many referrals have you received to date?
   - 0
   - 1-10
   - 11-25
   - 26-50
   - 50+

10. If applicable, approximately what percentage of these referrals have you not received payment for? (please enter whole number WITHOUT a % sign)

11. How does the volume of referrals received to date compare with initial expectations?
   - Significantly greater than expected
   - Slightly better than expected
   - As expected
   - Slightly less than expected
   - Significantly lower than expected

12. Given the current situation, would you say that your Work Programme contract is:
   - Viable for the whole contract period
• At risk of failure before the end of the contract period
• At risk of failure within the next 6 months

13. What level of payment do you receive for an attachment fee? (state N/A if not applicable)

14. What level of payment do you receive for a job outcome? (state N/A if not applicable)

15. What level of payment do you receive for a sustainment payment? (state N/A if not applicable)

16. Does your contract require you to return customers to your prime when sustainment payments kick in?
   • Yes
   • No
   • N/A

17. Are the financial terms you've agreed with your prime sustainable?
   • Yes
   • No
   • Difficult to predict at the moment

18. Has your prime helped your organisation manage with the payment structure of the Work Programme?
   • Yes
   • No

19. Has your organisation had to subsidise any of its Work Programme delivery with its own reserves?
   • Yes
   • No

20. Has the 'gagging clause' in your contract prohibited you from sharing good and bad practice with other providers?
   • Yes
   • No

21. Does your prime share supply chain performance data with your organisation?
   • Yes
   • No

22. Has the random allocation of referrals prohibited your organisation from servicing customers who would have benefited more from your organisation's specific area of expertise?
   • Yes
   • No
   • Difficult to know

23. Do you believe your prime contractor is keeping customers in-house who would benefit more from your organisation’s area of expertise?
   • Yes
   • No
• Difficult to know

24. Have you had to ‘park’ any customers because the cost of intervention exceeds the payment on offer?
• Yes
• No